Obama's Middle East End Game, ctd.

Introduction: On the Brink

Like Sisyphus, Obama is moving his grand strategy for the Middle East closer to the top of mountain. It's possible he's walked Israel back their coming war with Iran, he's made Russia responsible for monitoring Iran's nuclear program - and Russia does not want a nuclear Iran - and he's begun a "deck clearing" for building a regional security alliance to contain Iran.

Israel Decides to Dance With the One that Brought 'em

Earlier this summer I was one of a cacophony of voices who believed that Israel was probably on the verge of striking Iran's nascent nuclear program. I even ventured to guess that Israel would do with the tacit approval or even active support of the U.S. and the Gulf States.  I assumed that Israel really did not trust MAD to keep them secure vis-a-vis a nuclear Iran and I assumed that once the Gulf States got on board it was only a matter of time before the JDAMs started falling.

I was probably wrong.

Obama has always pursued two strategies WRT Iran; one was to get them give up the bomb peacefully, the other was to build a regional alliance to contain Iran once they went nuclear. Now, given that Iran lives in a really bad neighborhood, with nasty neighbors who harbor terrorists - including Bin Laden and Mullah Omar - it's logical for Iran to want either an actual warhead or at least break out capacity.

So that leaves containment.

But getting containment right involves building a security alliance for the Middle East ala NATO in Europe (just imagine the day those Gerrys and Frogs work together! Madness I say,  Madness!). And getting that security alliance involves getting the Arabs and Israelis to clear the deck -so-to-speak- when it comes to the two generations of animosity they share (it's a bullshit argument that there has "always been war in the Middle East, the regions has enjoyed long stretches of peace punctuated by periods of violence following imperial decline and everything we've seen since WWII is fallout from the British, French and German empires running out steam).

So, for the time being at least, Israel appears to be ready to gamble on with Obama towards some better greater Middle Eastern end-state.

Clearing the Deck

In this context, clearing the deck means putting the Palestinian issue to rest, thus providing top cover for the Saudis to finally recognize Israel's right to exist. To that end the talks that Obama announced late last week couldn't be more important to the future of the region.        

Mission Accomplished? Rethinking the strategic assumptions of the Bush Administration

Introduction:

Tom Barnett had a post last week that contrasted America's apparent post-surge success in Iraq with the rapidly deteriorating situation in Afghanistan.  Looking at the two situations begs an interesting question: was George W. Bush's "gut" instinct about the differences between Iraq and Afghanistan in 2002-03 correct?


Taking Our Eye off the Ball?

In his book Descent Into Chaos Pakistani-born journalist Ahmed Rashid lays out a pretty strong case that president Bush took his eyes off Afghanistan at a crucial point - mid 2002 - a point when, according to Rashid's sources in various NGOs, the United States had real opportunity to bring lasting peace to Afghanistan if only we had injected more troops/money/attention.

But the Bush administration had other ideas. By the middle of 2002 the U.S. was ramping up pressure on Saddam Hussein and plans were in place to take Hussein and his regime out. Critics of the Bush administration are fond of suggesting that this shift in focus, from south-central Asia to the Middle East was a major error, brought about by an irrational obsession with Hussein and "weapons of mass destruction".  This strategic blunder - so the story goes - wasted American lives in both Iraq and Afghanistan and directly contributed to the resurgence of the Taliban.

Charging the Mound

What I describe above is more or less conventional wisdom and there is every indication that even president Obama subscribes to this strategic analysis. But what if it is wrong? What if the Bush administration began to suspect the futility of dealing with Afghanistan sometime around the so-called "Airlift of Evil", that, assuming the U.S. had been ignorant of Pakistan's complicity with the Taliban, would have removed all doubt. So even in 2001 the U.S. was forced to deal with the fact that we were fighting an enemy - aka the Taliban - who had been functioning as a wholly owned subsidiary of our new best friend - Pakistan. Further, events between India and Pakistan across 2002 would have been a wake up call to anyone paying attention: this fight is not about the Taliban. This fight is about two nuclear armed South Asian states that house about 1/5th of humanity and over a quarter of a billion Muslims between them.

Once the Bush administration realized just how touchy the situation in Afghanistan was, and just how unlikely it was that anything resembling victory was even possible in Afghanistan, the administration began casting about for another project; something far less intractable, preferably in the Middle East proper (as the hijackers had been Sunni Arabs, not Pashtuns or Pakistanis). Iraq, which had been playing its cat and mouse games with the U.N. weapons inspectors for years provided as good a candidate for an experiment in "democratic peace theory" as anywhere else.

From that perspective then, Bush didn't "take his eye off the ball" - to continue the baseball analogy - he charged the mound. He changed the rules. "We can't win in Afghanistan because Pakistan won't let us? Fine, we'll go win somewhere else and Pakistan can reap what they sewed in Afghanistan."

The Lasting After Effects of Bush's Cynicism 

To say that the invasion of Iraq - and, by extension - the elevation of Iraq to a priority versus Afghanistan dose not excuse the Bush administration's behavior in the years that followed. There was absolutely no excuse for going into Iraq under staffed and under resourced or for telling the American people that Iraq would be a cake walk. In retrospect, I do regret my vote in 2004, because the gross incompetence of the first Bush administration should have earned him a one term presidency.

But both things can be true: Bush was a bad president; he was also right about Iraq versus Afghanistan in 2002. He was right that Afghanistan would turn out to be un-winnable. But the Rovian cynicism and political calculations required him to maintain a troop presence in Afghanistan and even as he was fighting a good fight to get the resources for the surge in Iraq he continued to add more troops to the Af-Pak theater and expand the war - via drones - into Pakistani territory. Bombing Pakistan makes sense. In fact, clearing the tubes on a couple of boomers into Islamabad probably would have been the best strategy on 9/12 2001, rather than getting ourselves sucked into the regional grudge match that is Afghanistan. But bombing Pakistan makes a lot more sense when we don't depend on them to get supplies to our troops and when we don't have troopers stationed close to the areas we are bombing - thus putting Americans within rifle range of pissed off villagers.

What Would George Bush (circa 2002) Do? 

The George Bush of 2002 felt that Afghanistan was best left to special forces, air strikes and former Northern Alliance warlords turned "governors". Before he was overtaken by event; overwhelmed by political opponents calling Afghanistan "the good war" versus Iraq as "the dumb war", before all of that happened George Bush had solid instincts about what was possible in south-central Asia versus what was possible in the heart of Sunni Arab world. Looking at the Middle East today we see economic growth in Jordon and Dubai; we see peace in Iraq and social reforms in Saudi Arabia. We see that the Bush of 2002 was more right than wrong.  

Planning to Fail in Afghanistan, pt 3

Mobile Blogging from here.

"I've seen the future, and it is murder."

--- Lenord Cohen

Is this story just another piece of idiot journalism from the NYT, or what?

I read this piece and I'm filled with a sense of both dejavu and a deep and unabiding sense of fear and loathing.

Suppose Obama is, indeed, planning to fail in Afghanistan. After he begins the pullout, then what? Does he go before the American people and just embrace defeat? After reading this article, reading Obama's nuclear posture review and seeing his circle jerk - er, "Nuclear Security Conference" - last week I'm wondering if there isn't an incredibly dumb yet surprsingly cohesive strategy in the whole thing: Barack Obama is going to win reelection by bombing Iran.

Sounds crazy, right?

But consider that perhaps things have not really gotten much better in Afghanistan. Consider that Obama has basically acquiesced to ISI/Taliban control of everything outside of Kabul. Consider that Obama then will be branded as mister "cut and run" by his opponent in 2012. Consider that Rambo is telling Obama that he's going to have to "triangulate" by getting tough on something and Iran is an easy target.

The more I think about it, the more sense bombing Iran probably makes to the increasingly vainglorious and strategicly tone- deaf crew we have running the policy shop at 1600 Pennsylvania Ave right now. The target package is fairly straight forward, and with a combination if cruise missile and B2 strike, coupled with a lingering campaign conducted via drones, a war against Iran must look like quit a splendid little war that we are certain to win- or at least end- in a really short time horizon.

Of course by losing Afghanistan and bombing Iran Obama will have completely erased all strategic rationale for his presidency. We will be no better off than if McCain/Palin had won and Obama's entire first/last term will have been a complete waist.

And the American people won't fall for it. Iran will squeeze whatever assets we have left in Afghanistan and Iraq and they'll do everything they can to escalate the adiministration into some kind of naval confrontation in the Gulf. It'll become clear pretty quickly that the attack achieved nothing and will probably hasten Iran's desire for a quick shoot just to prove that they still have a nuclear capacity.

And then Romney is going to have one hell of a mess on his hands January 21st, 2013.

[Posted with iBlogger from my iPhone]

Obama's Middle East Endgame: Part IV - The Iran/Iraq Dynamic

In 2003, when the U.S. invaded Iraq, the given reason was to stop Iraq from developing NBC (nuclear-chemical-biological) weapons.

Since Iraq has stabilized I've been wondering how long it will be before the U.S. takes a very different view of Iraq's nuclear ambitions, do mainly to Iran's nuclear program and Iraq's need to deter their historical enemy in Persia - which was the same reason Hussein sought nukes in the 1980s.

So today, as Iraq and Iran once again play their dangerous game, I imagine there are people inside both the Iraqi defense ministry and the American D.O.D. who are considering way to deter Iranian aggression against Iraq. And because Iran is a de facto nuclear power at this point, the options for deterring them are few:

1. Iraq could develop a notorious, indigenous, crash nuclear weapons program.
2. Iraq could embrace nuclear power for civilian use and follow the German/Japanese model of becoming a de facto nuclear power.
3. The U.S. can make an explicit security guarantee which places Iraq within a region wide, NATO style security agreement.
4. Iraq could pursue less kinetic means of fighting against the Iranians. For example, Iraqi government officials and clerics could express their moral outrage at every act of violence the Iranian regime perpetrates against its own people, or perhaps encourage Kurdish rabble rousing among the Iranian Kurdish population.

My guess is that over the short term options 2, 3 and 4 will be utilized by Iraq/the U.S. against Iran. Option 3 is a U.S. centric option but option 4 is an Iraqi centric option, because an Iraqi Shiite Muslim has the moral authority to speak out on behalf of the Iranian people that an American government official does not.   

Obama's Middle East Endgame: Part III - Getting to Moscow through Tehran

Yesterday I caught John Limbert n CSPAN's BookTV talking about his new book: Negotiating With Iran: Wrestling With the Ghosts of History.

Limbert has a Ph.D. from Harvard, has served in the State Department and is currently a professor at the U.S. Naval Academy. When someone in the audience asked him about Iran and Russia, his answer sounded oddly familiar to anyone who reads this blog.

He said that Russia has two great fears:

1. The U.S. will attack Iran
2. The U.S. will normalize relations with Iran

On a couple of firearms/shooting sports related forums where I post regularly (under a pseudonym), I am often castigated for having the crazy idea that Russia and Iran are natural enemies. The other forum users tend to believe what they see on CNN; Russia and Iran are "allies", Russia protects Iran in the U.N. and so on and so forth. I attempt to calmly explain that Persian and Russians have so much historical antipathy, that any "alliance" between Iran and Russia is bound to be fleeting and could easily be torn asunder were the U.S. to make the Iranians a better offer.

So now the Obama administration is trying to find a way to wind down the tension between the U.S. and Iran. This is a sensible policy choice. As soon the Shia/Sunni/Israeli tensions are stabilized in the middle east - both through accepting Iran's status as a de facto nuclear power and through bringing Israel, Jordon, Egypt and the Gulf States under a true "nuclear umbrella" that does more than just guarantees a second strike but also greatly reduces the chances that an Iranian strike would even get through. Once those ducks are in a row Iran will be better positioned to focus its energy on containing Russia.

But that's okay - because that is what Russia wants.

In stabilizing the Middle East through detente - and freeing up Iran to focus its foreign policy energies on fighting global warming - President Obama, Secretary Clinton and Secretary Gates are building a future worth creating. Obama has the potential to be the most successful foreign policy president since Richard Nixon if he manages to normalize relations between the U.S. and Iran before he leaves office.

Now, let's see if the president decides to get interested in building a future worth creating in Afghanistan.

 

I Don't Have to Write About Obama's Nobel Prize...

Because I can't say it better than Tom Friedman already did:

All that said, I hope Mr. Obama will take this instinct a step further when he travels to Oslo on Dec. 10 for the peace prize ceremony. Here is the speech I hope he will give:

“Let me begin by thanking the Nobel committee for awarding me this prize, the highest award to which any statesman can aspire. As I said on the day it was announced, ‘I do not feel that I deserve to be in the company of so many of the transformative figures who’ve been honored by this prize.’ Therefore, upon reflection, I cannot accept this award on my behalf at all.

“But I will accept it on behalf of the most important peacekeepers in the world for the last century — the men and women of the U.S. Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps.

“I will accept this award on behalf of the American soldiers who landed on Omaha Beach on June 6, 1944, to liberate Europe from the grip of Nazi fascism. I will accept this award on behalf of the American soldiers and sailors who fought on the high seas and forlorn islands in the Pacific to free East Asia from Japanese tyranny in the Second World War.

“I will accept this award on behalf of the American airmen who in June 1948 broke the Soviet blockade of Berlin with an airlift of food and fuel so that West Berliners could continue to live free. I will accept this award on behalf of the tens of thousands of American soldiers who protected Europe from Communist dictatorship throughout the 50 years of the cold war.

“I will accept this award on behalf of the American soldiers who stand guard today at outposts in the mountains and deserts of Afghanistan to give that country, and particularly its women and girls, a chance to live a decent life free from the Taliban’s religious totalitarianism.

“I will accept this award on behalf of the American men and women who are still on patrol today in Iraq, helping to protect Baghdad’s fledgling government as it tries to organize the rarest of things in that country and that region — another free and fair election.

“I will accept this award on behalf of the thousands of American soldiers who today help protect a free and Democratic South Korea from an unfree and Communist North Korea.

“I will accept this award on behalf of all the American men and women soldiers who have gone on repeated humanitarian rescue missions after earthquakes and floods from the mountains of Pakistan to the coasts of Indonesia. I will accept this award on behalf of American soldiers who serve in the peacekeeping force in the Sinai desert that has kept relations between Egypt and Israel stable ever since the Camp David treaty was signed.

“I will accept this award on behalf of all the American airmen and sailors today who keep the sea lanes open and free in the Pacific and Atlantic so world trade can flow unhindered between nations.

“Finally, I will accept this award on behalf of my grandfather, Stanley Dunham, who arrived at Normandy six weeks after D-Day, and on behalf of my great-uncle, Charlie Payne, who was among those soldiers who liberated part of the Nazi concentration camp of Buchenwald.

“Members of the Nobel committee, I accept this award on behalf of all these American men and women soldiers, past and present, because I know — and I want you to know — that there is no peace without peacekeepers.

I agree. And I'd like to add that I hope Obama understands that in order to make peace he will have fight his own party in order to shrink the Gap and grow the Core.

Obama 2012: Some really early thoughts....

LFP = Light Foot Print, meaning drones, CIA paramilitary operators and SOCOM

The above chart represents my guess, as of right now, about how the different scenarios will play out for both Obama's choice on Afghanistan and the economy.  I've come up with three scenarios (good, bad and ugly) for each and handicapped Obama's reelection chances if each scenario comes to pass.

On the economy:

Three words: jobs jobs jobs.

As you can see, my ugly scenario involves us heading into approximately January/February 2012 with unemployment =/>10%. Under this scenario, Obama might as well step aside and give Hillary Clinton or Jim Webb a shot at the presidency, because he will be unable to even campaign. Also, he'll be able to do whatever he wants in Afghanistan and it and won't matter, because with an economy in that condition no one will be paying attention to Afghanistan. I find this scenario the least likely of the three.

My bad scenario has unemployment hovering somewhere between 6 and 10% basically for all of Obama's first term. My gut tells me we stay on the high side of that range, maybe an average of around 8.5% for Obama's whole first term. But the absolute unemployment rate probably matters less than the trend line in early 2012, and if the president can catch a couple of lucky breaks he could make the "morning in America" argument if unemployment is dropping from 8.5 or 9% in 2011 down to 7 or 8% in 2012. Indeed, after four years of suffering such a rapid drop will wind up looking very refreshing to most Americans.

In the bad (and most likely) scenario, the economy is just bad enough to make the race against (insert not-Palin here) competitive but just good enough to make reelection possible. In this scenario Afghanistan could matter a great deal if it is handled wrong. First, if Obama goes with my bad Afghan scenario and either completely withdraws or leaves behind just Spec Ops guys and killer robots, maybe, just maybe, the American people will be so sick of war and so happy with the relative economic gains that they will be willing to overlook the Republicans attack on Obama's "surrender"* to the Taliban and Al Qaeda.

What will not fly under any circumstances is the status quo "ugly" scenario that basically kicks the can down the road on the COIN vs. outsource-it-to-killer-robot decision and allows enough troops to stay in the country to provide decent targets to the Taliban but not enough to really protect the population. This is the situation we are in now and it is untenable, even if some bloggers think we have the option of waiting.  My sources say we have to shift from "don't worry we're leaving" to "don't worry we're staying" or we will never build the kind of relationships we need to fight the Taliban.

Finally, I have an across the board "good scenario" in which unemployment drops back down the 2005-06 or mid to late 1990s levels. Under this scenario, Obama could win pretty handily even if he leaves Afghanistan to the Terminators and the Taliban and he will be almost unbeatable if he orders a successful "surge" style COIN strategy that stands up local militias to fight the Taliban all over the country.

I've made it clear that I believe Obama should support General McChrystal's recommendation and order a full on COIN strategy (based on what I heard at the COIN conference we need ~30 battalions - 30k troops) that both protects the population and begins embedding American forces with their Afghan counter-parts. But I'll admit there are plenty of risks, not the least of which is that the Afghan government could continue to be plagued with corruption and allegations of election fraud which would make it very difficult to counter the Taliban's argument that Karzi's regime is the corrupt tool of the imperialist west. It's also possible that Pakistan could continue to hedge between the U.S. and a Pashtun (read: Taliban) government in Afghanistan which would allow the ISI to continue to build their "farm team" for the coming war with India in Kashmir. Both AQ and the Taliban would love to see another Mumbai-style (or better yet 9/11) attack inside India that will be linked back to the ISI and force America to choose between the two south Asian states.

At home, the war appears to be loosing support but I say ignore the polls for the time being. The Republicans are basically in favor of increasing the troops in Afghanistan and that means that both Obama and whoever his opponent will be in 2012 will own this war (to see how this plays out in a national elections Google, Kerry, John: Voted for it before I voted against it). So unless Obama is worried that Cindy Sheehan and Micheal Moore are going to run against him, I don't think the negative polling on Afghanistan will have any real negative consequences if he decides to go with the high end of McChrystal's recommendation. In fact, Obama should be hoping for such a confrontation, because a public slap-down on Micheal Moore would probably boost Obama's approval among moderates and independents.   

In conclusion, I believe Obama has one path on the economy and two paths on Afghanistan if he is going to seek reelection in 2012. On the economy, the most important factor will be putting America back to work, but he can win without achieving "full employment" so long as the the unemployment numbers are trending down by 2012. In Afghanistan, Obama can go big and long or go home, but the status quo both in terms of troop strength and strategy is unacceptable and will cost Obama the presidency in 2012 no matter what happens to the economy.

*This depends on who he runs against. I'll deal with this in another post.

Were the Russians really surprised by Iran's Secrete Nuke Site?

I'm going to go out on a limb and say, "defiantly, maybe" .

The Russians seem to greet the news that Iran had a nuclear site that has been thus far secrete with an angry statement.

So are they really angry? Maybe.

Actually, Russian anger over Iran having a secrete program fits nicely with my thesis that Russia has more to fear from an Iranian nuke than America does. So, if the Russians had been in contact with Iran about its nuclear sites thus far and perhaps were somehow sure that the Iranians either were not going to weaponize or were otherwise on a tight leash, then the revelation that Iran had secrete site would scare them, because it means that Iran felt the need to hide their real intentions from the Russians as well as the Americans and everyone else.

Of course the Iranians feel the need to hide this site from the Russians, they have more to fear from Russia than from the U.S.

Blogwriter for Iphone sucks: Or: My experience at the COIN conference

COIN CONFERENCE

I tried to update this blog during the COIN conference, but unfortunately, Blogwriter for Iphone sucks. I was unable to update effectively from the Counter-Insurgency Leadership in Iraq and Afghanistan Conference this past Wednesday.

Still, I have to say the conference was both great and more than a bit worrying.

The event was well organized and featured a list of experts that included Eliot Cohen, Tom Ricks, Bing West, Bob Kaplan and General Patraeus. I was impressed with all of the presentation and found the level of candor, especially from the active duty marines who were both presenting and asking questions in the audience, to be impressive. Everyone was completely upfront about the Herculean task the U.S. is involved in Afghanistan and the tremendous costs that will be associated with victory. The conference was hosted by the Marine Corp University, and the very existence of a conference like this demonstrates the Corps' commitment to being a learning organization.

The problem is that, as much as the conference demonstrated the Marine Corps as a learning organization, it also revealed the civilian bureaucracy and elected officials may not be.

The first bit of truly bad news came from Bing West, author of the outstanding The Strongest Tribe: War, Politics and the Endgame in Iraq, who had recently returned from Afghanistan. West showed pictures and short video outlining one of the major problems with operation in Afghanistan as they are currently undertaken: the coalition is not finishing any fire fights. The average engagement is taking place at ranges in the 400-600 meter range (side note: I can speak from personal experience as a civilian target shooter that this has to be pushing the 5.56mm round to its absolute effective limits) and the enemy is calling all the shots; they are deciding when to make and break contact and they are able to move a lot faster than the their American or Afghan Army counterparts. And every single soldier and marine, active or retired (about 12 or so throughout the course of the day) made the same statement about COIN - the first rule is to win the firefight. We are not winning the firefights in Afghanistan. The only way to win is to call on indirect artillery or air support, and General McChrystal has recently asked coalition forces to limit their use of air strikes to reduce collateral damage. This has puts the coalition in a position where the enemy is in control and West reinforced this point by putting up a picture of the mountains of Afghanistan and stating that every convey, whether U.S. military or Afghan government, is being watched from the mountains. I was reminded of the line from the Billy Joel song "Good Night Saigon": "We ruled the coastline, and they held the highlands."

Another issue which came up repeatedly was the need, in a COIN operation, to build trust between the U.S. and local forces. Several senior officers, active and retired, offered examples of the way in which these relationships had been crucial in aligning the coalition of forces that made the Surge in the Iraq so successful. The problem is that this sort of relationship building is not going well in Afghanistan. General Barno (Ret) reported that he is constantly asked by his counterparts both in Afghanistan and Pakistan whether or not the U.S. is going to abandon them, again (the first time being after the Soviets left). He said that we need to change our mindset from, "don't worry, we're leaving," to "don't worry, we're staying." This forces everyone who does business with us to hedge their bets, which is why the Pakistanis are reluctant to come down too hard on their own Pashtun insurgency, because they see it as their back bench to use in a future conflict with India in Kashmir. And with the U.S. bound to pull out (in their estimation) the Pakistanis figure we will be backing India in any future conflict between the two countries - it's a good bet by the way - and we should be arguing with Pakistan that if they became more like India - more economically connected to us - they would be in a better strategic position, but I digress.

That point of mistrust, not just between the Afghan and Pakistani forces and American government but also between the military brass and the civilian leadership here at home was palpable throughout the conference. One speaker after another made it clear that the civilians in D.C. simply do not understand what sort of promise is being made when they say they are willing to fight a nation-wide counter insurgency. One marine officer suggested that 30 more battalions (~30k+ troops) will be needed. And just about every speaker mentioned that the relationship between the U.S. and Afghani governments must be reexamined, that we must use the leverage we have over the Afghan government to gain the power to fire bad leaders in the, not just the Afghan government, but also the military. Also, the U.S. must be willing to embed American forces with Afghani forces and as it is not only does that not happen, but Bing West reports that he's seen units that were partnered with Afghan units pulled when the region gets too hot. A corollary to that point is that American units are currently sequestered on large bases (in the interest of "force protection") sometimes as far as 90 miles from the villages they are tasked with patrolling. This is a violation of one of the first principals General Patraeus articulated when he got to Iraq: don't commute to work. Counter insurgency cannot be conducted on a part-time basis, but currently the average area of Afghanistan that's patrolled at all is patrolled for just 30 minutes a day. This makes it impossible to control the population and difficult to learn any actionable intelligence, to say nothing of the added danger of being on the road (and therefore exposed to roadside bombs and ambushes) for more hours each day. Several officers made the point that the U.S. must shut down the big bases and send the troops out to live among the population.

In Washington today the concept of "offshore balancing" or counter-terrorism are all the rage, the suggestion being that the U.S. could get the job done in Afghanistan with just special forces and predator drones. Alternately, some suggest we should just focus on Pakistan, where the real "danger" exists because its an unstable country with nuclear weapons. All of these notions were kicked around at the conference and the consensus was not optimistic about either one. The Taliban is a Pashtun insurgency, and so only by engaging the Pashtun population can the insurgency be defeated. And the same Pushtun insurgency that fuels the Taliban fuels the Pakistani Pashtun insurgency, so the notion that Afghanistan or Pakistan is an either/or proposition is ludicrous.

The U.S. may not have any "good" options in Afghanistan right now, but perhaps the least bad option is to do with Afghanistan what President Bush did in Iraq in 2006; trust the generals and double down on a full scale COIN campaign. President Obama needs to understand that whatever short term political gains may be had by withdrawing or drastically drawing down troops would quickly be overshadowed by the instability in the region and by the incredible publicity win it would represent for Osama Bin Laden. And believe me, if he draws down, Obama will be the man who surrendered to Bin Laden in 2012 against Mitt Romney whether that's a fair assessment or not.

And not for nothing, but victory is possible in Afghanistan. As Eliot Cohen pointed out: there is a danger is hubris but their is also a danger in cliche's. It is entirely possible that the people who lived in Afghanistan 100 years ago are very different from the people that lived there today, and its important to remember that millions of Afghan civilians do want (and have) their daughters in school. One of the speakers at the COIN conference was the director of Radio Free Afghanistan, the most popular radio station in the country, who reported on receiving thousands of letters from Afghan civilians thanking RFA for being on the air and providing the Afghans with an object source of news as well as entertainment.

The good news is that the U.S. Marine Corps, and the military as a whole (though to lesser extent) is a learning organization. The skills sets and experience which are needed to beat the Taliban exist in our military at a level that would have been unheard of in 2003. From "strategic corporals" right through the chairman of CETCOM, everyone involved understands what is needed to win and the only question that remains is whether or the civilian leadership will be willing to give them the tools they need. For democrats in the House and Senate the temptation to quit will be very strong, but remember, a pull out virtually guarantees that Obama will be a one-term president. I promise the American people will not forgive a anyone who surrenders to the Taliban, whether that person serves in the House, the Senate or the White House.  The American people will, however, forgive a long and difficult slog (see: President Bush's reelection in 2004) provided we have a leader who is willing to stand before them and explain in no uncertain terms why this is a battle worth fighting. President Obama should plan such a speach, before both the American people and a joint-session of congress, as soon as possible. Because, at the end of the day, leadership in counter insurgency must come from the top.

Putin Gets Everything He Wants: Or: Obama hands Putin a Beautiful White Elephant

"Everyone gets everything he wants."

- Capt. Willard, Apocalypse Now





I don't know how to say "when the Gods wish to punish us, they will answer our prayers" in Russian, but Putin and Co. should hope somebody inside the Kremlin does. To that end, God (or Obama) answered one of the Putin's favorite prayers this week by agreeing to pull GBI (ground based interceptors) out of Poland and the Czech Republic. Given Russia's truculence of late, and given Poland's history since 1939, its not surprising that Poland is none too please with Obama's decision.

Putin and his droogs really ought to take a minute to consider why Margret Thatcher asked Gorbachev not to "tear down that wall" in 1989. What Thatcher understood was that Europe had been at peace, at that time for 45 years, because it had been outsourcing its security to the U.S. and to a lessor extent to the Soviet Union. The Warsaw Pact-NATO axis preserved stability and kept the formerly rampant nationalism of Southern, Eastern and Central Europe in check. Thatcher was old enough to remember the last time no outside power would step in to guarantee the security of Eastern Europe and the massive war that followed.

In the end, thankfully, history has so far proved Thatcher completely wrong, in a way, because the former Soviet nations in Europe have, with the exception of Yugoslavia (never really part of the Soviet block anyway) remained fairly calm.

Of course another way to look at Thatcher's fear is to say, yes, she was absolutely right, and that Europe did need an outside power to whom it could outsource its security - it's just that that power could be the U.S. And indeed, after the Cold War the U.S. stepped in immediately to begin expanding NATO, first into East Germany and then all the way to Poland, the Baltic states and maybe someday Georgia and the Ukraine.

So this week, when the President of the United States seemingly bowed to Russian pressure to remove our ground based interceptors from Poland and the Czech republic, Obama began what I suspect will wind up being a long term experiment, conducted on live subjects in real-time, on whether or not Europe still needs to outsource its security to the U.S.

In the short term this is a win for Russia, but over a longer horizon, say, 5 or 10 years, this could go down as one of the worst things to ever happen to Russia foreign policy.

Now that Obama has suggested an answer to the age old question, "Would the Americans trade New York for ________ (insert European city here)" , the Poles, Czechs and Ukrainians have to be looking into other means of resisting Russian pressure. And those means come on two time horizons; short term and long term.

In the short term I expect the Baltic states, the Caucuses, the Ukraine along with Poland and Czech republic will be building up their capacity for asymmetrical warfare including a "leave behind" capacity to wreck Russian supply lines in the event of invasion as well as an increased "asset" gathering inside Russia proper (read: making contacts with Chechnyaians, Mafia types and any other anti-regime elements) and perhaps even the insertion of "sleeper agents" or sleeper cells who will lurk around inside the Russian Federation and go to work if things heat up.

Over the longer term, I suspect Poland and the Czech republic will soon take the lead on reducing their carbon output by building more "peaceful nuclear reactors" (like the reactors Iran is building) and getting themselves pretty quickly up to a "Japanese" level of nuclear ambiguity. Poland may already be in possession of 7 "Frogs", left over from the Cold War, and though an unguided short-range missile is not as effective as a missile that can hit Russia, the Poles should be able to reverse engineer the warheads in short order. Then with the warhead technology and nuclear fuel from their "peaceful civilian program" the Poles should have a hedge against Russian chicanery and can ask Russia "Would you be willing to trade Moscow for Warsaw?"

Of course, Poland is not the only neighbor of Russia which may be on the verge of going nuclear. And therein lies the beauty of Putin getting everything he wants, because, its certainly a short-term black eye for America, but it creates a long term challenge for a wizened, weakened and dying Russian. America's neighbors are friendly and unarmed, whereas Russia is surrounded by pissed off, nationalistic countries that will increasingly see fit to arm themselves lest they get carved up like Georgia , a country which I imagine is examining its carbon-output reduction options as we speak.

To top it all off, Iran, which already posses a missile that can hit Russia, had crowds in the street today shouting "Down with Russia!"


The day will come in the not-too-distant future, when Russia wants to throw its weight around in the Caucuses or central Asia and all of these answered prayers are going to haunt them. Until then, I hope the Poles and Czechs do their part to reduce global warming, I hope the protesters keep going until A-Jad either steps down or "gets Ceascued" and I hope Putin keeps getting everything he wants.

Obama's Middle East Endgame: Part II - The June 12th Wildcard

In a previous post I hypothesized that Obama's Middle East End Game was to get the Sunni Arab states and Israel sitting together in a security framework to push back against Iran.

But what if something changes in Iran?

From Andrew Sullivan, earlier this week:

I don't know whether you have been reading the various press accounts of the election campaign in Iran. I know that the candidates' list is fixed, but I can also see democratic spirit when it is bang in front of me. There appears to be a genuine fight for votes; and the images from the Mousavi rallies look more like Obama rallies than assemblies in a totalitarian state. Notice how young these people look, and how unafraid. Does anyone doubt that if this kid of peaceful campaigning were happening in Iraq, it would be regarded as a sign of a nascent democracy? And, for what it's worth, Ahmadinejad increasingly looks desperate - the bribing of Red Iran doesn't seem as powerful right now as the rallying of Blue Iran. Check out the photos of a May Mousavi rally headlined by Khatami on this Iranian photo-blog, TehranLive.org.

From the New York Times

Mr. Moussavi, a former prime minister, was born in Khameneh, a small town near this northwestern city in East Azerbaijan Province. He was speaking here on Tuesday as part of a two-day tour to win the votes of Turkish speakers, nearly one-third of Iran’s eligible voters.

In his speech, Mr. Moussavi denounced the pressure put on student activists through expulsions and jail terms during Mr. Ahmadinejad’s term and called the president’s policies “old and backward.”

He said the major goal of the 1979 revolution was freedom.

“We wanted to become free and be progressive in the world, not faced with backward ideas and notions today,” he said.

The rally was an unusual event in this northwestern city, where political and social restrictions are enforced more fiercely than in the capital, Tehran.

Young men and women sang together, and even moved their bodies rhythmically to the music. The young men rushed from their side of the segregated auditorium to the women’s side, to take cellphone pictures of girls dancing. The women had green headbands or ribbons in their hair, and had pushed back the black hoods they are required to wear as far back as they could go.

Many in the audience said they were frustrated by four years of economic mismanagement and social and political suppression under Mr. Ahmadinejad. They said they hoped that Mr. Moussavi would reverse those policies.

Nassim, 19, a radiology student, who withheld her family name for fear of retribution, said she had to resign as a member of her university’s Islamic Association, the only pro-reform political association for student activists, because of pressure from university hard-liners.

“I could not even do social or cultural work,” she said. “They accused us of doing political work no matter what we did.”

And beyond simple rallies, this week witnessed a fiery debate between Ahmadinejad and Moussavi in which Moussavi called out the current administration for its anti-semitic remarks and failed foreign polices:

He also took issue with Mr. Ahmadinejad’s constant questioning of the Holocaust, saying that it harmed the country’s standing with the rest of the world and undermined its dignity. “For the past four years you kept saying that the United States is collapsing,” Mr. Moussavi said. “You have said Israel is collapsing. France is collapsing.”

He added, “Your foreign policies have been based on such illusional perceptions.”

So what happens if Moussavi wins?

I think its unlikely that Iran would be quick to capitulate on its nuclear program. They live in a bad neighborhood filled with unstable nuclear powers and aggressive, nuclear armed petro-ocracies.

I like to point out that I wouldn't live in my neighborhood if I didn't own a gun, so I shouldn't expect Iran to accept existence in a dangerous area without a nuclear deterrent.

So where does this leave Iran and U.S.? And by extension Iran and the U.S.-Israeli-Sunni Arab partnership?

It's hard to say. For his part, Obama has hinted that the U.S. may be willing to drop preconditions on talks with Iran.

I've often heard that in 1969, when the Soviets were considering attacking China, a Soviet emissary was sent to speak with someone in the White House about what America's reaction would be if the Sovs bombed China's nuclear facilities. Nixon's response was swift and unambiguous: the U.S. would not accept a Soviet attack on China. It seems to me that the Iran-Israel-U.S. situation right now is similar.

Assuming three things are true:

• a). The Israelis are serious about attacking Iran's nuclear program and the Iranians know that they are serious.
• b).The Iranians know that the consequences of Israel's attack would be both devastating and difficult completely predict.
• c). That Iran wants maintain at minimum a strategic nuclear ambiguity for deterrence.

Then the only sensible move for the Iranians to make would be for Moussavi to immediately reach out for formal talks with the Obama administration as soon as possible, assuming he wins.* Obama then has the ability to do to Israel what Nixon did with Iran - declare that an attack on Iran would be absolutely unacceptable. This would serve to weaken Netanyahou's government and probably push back the planned Israeli strike indefinitely.

The Sunni regimes won't be happy about the opening of the relations between Iran and America, but it won't matter. Better relations between the U.S. and Iran, similar to relations between China and the U.S., make everything else a feit accompli.


*All bets are off if Ahmadinejad wins, he benefits from conflict with the west.

Obama's Middle East Endgame: Part I - Israel, Iran and Nukes

Tom Barnett, the eternal optimist, is less than sanguine about the possibility of avoiding an Israeli strike on Iran's nuclear program. In a blistering piece in Esquire, Tom looks at three possible scenarios for the near term relationship between Israel, American, the Sunni Arab countries and Tehran. Here is his "ugly" scenario:

Israel decides to act on its own by launching massive (even if they're dubbed "surgical") air strikes against Iran's nuclear facilities sometime before the end of the year. Israel and its (re-)new(ed) prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu are clearly not feeling the usual love from the Obama White House, as evidenced by how all the media coverage of their first summit centered on "who had the upper hand?" (Obama on freezing settlements, or Netanyahu on striking Iran?)

In his speech today, Obama slung some loaded words toward Tehran: "My country is ready to move forward," and "we will proceed with courage, rectitude, and resolve," and "we have reached a decisive point."

If that means America isn't going to wait and see about anything when it comes to this increasingly tense triangle of love and hate, we may be reaching that big decision. And pursuing the Saudi-first scenario, however reticent Abdullah now may be to stepping outside the line of the Arab League (they want Israel to make the next concession on settlements), may just be Obama's best chance to beat both Tel Aviv and Tehran to their prospective punches. I mean, whatever Abdullah demands in return, the price will likely be worth it.

Here's why: If Netanyahu were to pull the trigger, Tehran would retaliate with both barrels — as in Hamas and Hezbollah. That would kill any two-state solution right there for Obama's entire first term, something Netanyahu would likely welcome as a two-birds-with-one-stone bonus. Stipulating that any direct kinetic response out of Iran against Israel would be a serious wild card, the more prosaic fall-out (pun intended) would be this: Iran would radically speed up its pursuit of nuclear weaponry, as would both Turkey and Saudi Arabia (who logically are colluding on this goal already). Toss in Egypt and the UAE as likely follow-ups.

In that scary pathway, the Saudis could well choose to reignite a proxy war (Saudi-backed Sunni vs. Iranian-backed Shia) within Iraq as a way of tying down Tehran somewhat (along with a generous buyout of wavering Iranian ally Syria). In this scenario, it really wouldn't matter whether or not Ahmadinejad won re-election next week, because a "righteously" angered Iran would be forced to ratchet up its anti-American efforts in both Iraq and Afghanistan, shredding Obama wind-down goals in the process and setting him up for a tough re-election battle in 2012 (He didn't end any wars like he promised!).

You know, when you add it all up, The Ugly scenario seems like such a win-win-win for Netanyahu (bomb Iran, screw the two-state solution, pin down the untrustworthy Obama elsewhere) that it gets hard to see what could really happen in the short term to prevent its unfolding — other than moderate Iranians voting early and often!

Ugly is right. The Center for Strategic and Internarional Studies recently released a report on a possible Israeli strike on Iran and their analysis details what a nasty thing such an attack would be. Highlights include:

1. It would be nearly impossible for Israel to reach the nuclear sights with conventional aircraft, so they would most likely use Jericho III ballistic missiles.
2. The fallout would almost certainly kill thousands in the short term, and possibly cause contamination hundreds of miles downwind - including within the Gulf States, that could cause health problems for years to come.
3. Despite all of that, they would probably only set the program back a few years.

It seems that Israel wants it both ways. They want the the U.S. to sign off on their strike package while they build their settlements and kick the can down the road on making peace with their Sunni neighbors. On the other hand, the Israelis fail to realize that the Sunni Arab regiems are at least as afraid of Iran as the Israelis are.

Interestingly, Jeffery Goldberg suggests that Obama may be attempting an end run around Netanyahu's government to force a new coalition that would be willing to strike a deal with the U.S. and the Sunni Arab regimes.

The end game in all of this is to put Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Israel on the same side of a security framework to resist Iran.

Obama's Middle East Endgame: Prolouge -The Cario Speech: Nice Hat - Awaiting the Arival of Cattle

Unlike his misguided appointment of Judge Sotomayor, President Obama's Cairo speech was a good early step towards moving America's policies in a positive direction. Frankly, it's times like this that I'm glad I voted for the guy, there is simply no other American politician who could go to Egypt and approach this topic with such earnestness:

PRESIDENT OBAMA: Thank you very much. Good afternoon. I am honored to be in the timeless city of Cairo, and to be hosted by two remarkable institutions. For over a thousand years, Al-Azhar has stood as a beacon of Islamic learning; and for over a century, Cairo University has been a source of Egypt's advancement. And together, you represent the harmony between tradition and progress. I'm grateful for your hospitality, and the hospitality of the people of Egypt. And I'm also proud to carry with me the goodwill of the American people, and a greeting of peace from Muslim communities in my country: Assalaamu alaykum. (Applause.)

We meet at a time of great tension between the United States and Muslims around the world -- tension rooted in historical forces that go beyond any current policy debate. The relationship between Islam and the West includes centuries of coexistence and cooperation, but also conflict and religious wars. More recently, tension has been fed by colonialism that denied rights and opportunities to many Muslims, and a Cold War in which Muslim-majority countries were too often treated as proxies without regard to their own aspirations. Moreover, the sweeping change brought by modernity and globalization led many Muslims to view the West as hostile to the traditions of Islam.

Violent extremists have exploited these tensions in a small but potent minority of Muslims. The attacks of September 11, 2001 and the continued efforts of these extremists to engage in violence against civilians has led some in my country to view Islam as inevitably hostile not only to America and Western countries, but also to human rights. All this has bred more fear and more mistrust.

So long as our relationship is defined by our differences, we will empower those who sow hatred rather than peace, those who promote conflict rather than the cooperation that can help all of our people achieve justice and prosperity. And this cycle of suspicion and discord must end.

I've come here to Cairo to seek a new beginning between the United States and Muslims around the world, one based on mutual interest and mutual respect, and one based upon the truth that America and Islam are not exclusive and need not be in competition. Instead, they overlap, and share common principles -- principles of justice and progress; tolerance and the dignity of all human beings.

President Bush often made the statement that America was not at war with Islam per Se, but he was never able to articulate the point so eloquently and holistically, acknowledging a complex history while calling for a brighter future.

Was it long on rhetoric and short on specifics? Yep. Sometimes that's OK, however, because words do matter. So long as this is an early step and not the whole plan its a very good start.

Perhaps his most controversial (at least in the mainstream media) statement was directed at a country that is, at least ostensibly, an ally:

At the same time, Israelis must acknowledge that just as Israel's right to exist cannot be denied, neither can Palestine's. The United States does not accept the legitimacy of continued Israeli settlements. (Applause.) This construction violates previous agreements and undermines efforts to achieve peace. It is time for these settlements to stop. (Applause.)

And Israel must also live up to its obligation to ensure that Palestinians can live and work and develop their society. Just as it devastates Palestinian families, the continuing humanitarian crisis in Gaza does not serve Israel's security; neither does the continuing lack of opportunity in the West Bank. Progress in the daily lives of the Palestinian people must be a critical part of a road to peace, and Israel must take concrete steps to enable such progress.

Pnwed.

There was quit a bit of State Department boilerplate, of course. For example, Obama continued his silliness on nukes, calling for nuclear free world, telling Iran to halt production of nukes, etc. Nonsense really, but it's ok as long he really doesn't take it that sort of thing too seriously.

All and all the speech was a good begining.